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Abstract
Prompted by both promises and pitfalls in Michael’s Zürn’s A Theory of Global
Governance, this paper reflects on challenges going forward beyond liberal institutionalism
in the study of world politics. Six suggestions are particularly highlighted for future the-
orizing of global governance: (a) further distance from state-centrism; (b) greater attention
to transscalar qualities of global governing; (c) more incorporation of social-structural
aspects of global regulation; (d) trilateral integration of individual, institutional, and struc-
tural sources of legitimacy in global governance; (e) more synthesis of positive and nor-
mative analysis; and (f) transcendence of Euro-centrism. Together these six shifts
would generate a transformed global governance theory – and possibly practice as well.
Keywords: Euro-centrism; global governance; institutionalism; legitimacy; social structure; transscalarity
Introduction
Early 2018 saw the publication of a milestone work in institutionalist scholarship
on global governance. In A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy
& Contestation, Michael Zürn transcends a long-standing deadlock of
realism-vs.-liberalism with what he dubs a ‘global politics paradigm’.1 The volume
offers a novel four-step reading of the development of global governance, especially
highlighting struggles over legitimacy. Zürn provides a compelling analysis: concep-
tually sophisticated, methodologically meticulous, empirically rich, and (in its
implications for practice) politically important.
A Theory also stimulates wider reflection about contributions and limitations of
institutionalist analysis of world order. The term ‘institutionalism’ is employed here
in the vein of international relations (IR) theory, as variously conveyed with other
labels such as ‘transnationalism’, ‘regime theory’, and ‘neoliberalism’. Recent IR
institutionalist research has prominently explored issues of accountability,
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press.
1Zürn 2018.
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authority, complexity, experimentalism, forum shopping, fragmentation, gridlock,
indicators, legitimacy, and orchestration. For IR institutionalists, global governance
is about explicit rules and concrete regulatory organizations with a planetary span –
and about the ways that agents engage with these apparatuses, both cooperatively
and competitively, to pursue their ideas and interests.2
Five decades of IR institutionalist research on global governance have yielded
major advances in knowledge of world order, many of them amply manifested
in Zürn’s A Theory. Thanks to this collective work, scholarship today is far more
alert to regulation on regional and global scales. In addition, IR institutionalists
have explored the workings of power not only through states, but also through non-
state entities, networks, norms, and (occasionally) macro social structures such as
capitalism and gender hierarchies.3
Yet, while pushing institutionalist knowledge of world order to new frontiers, A
Theory also reveals important shortfalls of this approach. From my perspective of
critical global political sociology, six points especially come to the fore: namely, per-
sistent gravitation toward intergovernmentalism; reification of governance ‘levels’;
neglect of wider social structures; restricted conception of the sources of legitimacy;
subordination of normative considerations; and engrained Euro-centrism. Some of
these shortcomings could be considerably addressed with adjustments to IR insti-
tutionalist analysis, while other deficits are intrinsic to the paradigm itself.
Attending to these issues could move knowledge beyond institutionalism, albeit
that the present short commentary can only suggest starting points for a more
encompassing and transformed theory of global governance.
Transcending intergovernmentalism
One chronic problem to date with IR institutionalist scholarship is a difficulty fully
to shake off state-centrism. Certainly the approach emerged from the 1970s onward
substantially in order to address the general neglect of nonstate actors by older legal
and realist studies of ‘international organization’.4 Nevertheless, much institution-
alist global governance research of past decades has still started with a concern for
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and then only ‘added on’ nongovernmen-
tal components. Zürn himself acknowledges this contrast between a broader actor
perspective in global governance theory and tenacious state-centrism in much insti-
tutionalist research practice.5 Thus the conceptual discussion in A Theory highlights
nonstate components of global governance, but the empirical content of the volume
still predominantly relates to states and IGOs.
IGO-centric datasets particularly encourage this disconnect between theory and
empirics. Most large-N evidence for global governance – including the data incor-
porated in Zürn’s book – remains stubbornly intergovernmentalist. Several recent
2‘Institutionalism’ in IR is thus distinct from ‘institutionalism’ as generally understood in political econ-
omy and sociology. The critiques directed here at ‘institutionalism’ in IR often do not apply (as much) to
‘institutionalism’ in other disciplines. Indeed, greater interdisciplinary outreach from IR, as already ongoing
in some quarters, could substantially alleviate at least some of the problems identified in the present paper.
3Barnett and Duvall 2004.
4Keohane and Nye 1972; Mansbach et al. 1976.
5Zürn 2018, 264.
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innovative initiatives go wider,6 but in general quantitative research remains well
behind academic theory and concrete practice of governing a global world.
Indeed, after a burst of multilateralist energy in the 1990s, the early 21st century
has sooner seen stagnation in formal treaty-based intergovernmentalism.7 No
major new IGOs have appeared after the International Criminal Court in 1998,
and preexisting multilateral bodies have not undergone noteworthy expansion,
although Zürn affirms that there has been some continuing rise in IGO authority
over states.8 Instead, the main growth areas of recent global governance lie in alter-
native organizational forms such as transgovernmental networks, private regula-
tion, and multistakeholder arrangements. Yet, these architectures figure little in
A Theory.
To be sure, other important IR research has highlighted this wider variety of
institutional designs.9 Relevant articles appear regularly in a new generation of jour-
nals established since the mid-1990s, such as European Journal of International
Relations, Global Governance, and Review of International Political Economy.
That said, some of the older and most cited IR journals, as well as the more recently
established Review of International Organizations, persist with a disproportionate
focus on IGOs. Moreover, much research on new forms of global governance has
come from outside IR in law, management, public administration, and sociology.10
Hence, along with several other contributors to this symposium, I would urge
further reorientation concerning global governance actors. IR institutionalism
needs to consider more institutions. It is not enough to acknowledge that nonstate
actors matter and then fall back on state-centrism. Instead of starting with IGOs
and then contemplating supplementary attention for other organizational forms,
researchers could better first ask ‘who is governing’, without prejudice as to the rele-
vant types of regulatory agencies.11 Begin by looking for the rules and then identify
who is making them, rather than the other way around.
Unmaking ‘levels’
A second key wanted adjustment to IR institutionalist scholarship concerns
approaches to geography. Already 50 years ago, certain theorists of world politics
critiqued the ontological separation of – and instead emphasized interconnections
across – national and international spaces.12 Some subsequent institutionalist
research has examined domestic influences on international governance or nation-
ally differentiated application of international norms. Yet, this and other work con-
tinues to reify ‘levels’, dividing the global, the regional, the national, and the local.
Neglect of transscalar connections that perforate these demarcations misses much
of the overall dynamic of contemporary governance.
6Kelley and Simmons 2020; Westerwinter 2019.
7Keohane 2020; Abbott and Faude 2020.
8Zürn 2018, 126–27; also Hooghe et al. 2017.
9E.g. Hall and Biersteker 2009; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Hale and Held 2011; Raymond and DeNardis
2015; Scholte 2020b.
10E.g. Slaughter 2004; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Halliday and Shaffer 2015.
11Cf. Barnett et al. 2021.
12Rosenau 1967.
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The very label ‘global governance’ encourages a separate focus on global arenas.
Hence, for example, institutionalist studies of ‘global’ economic governance have
primarily examined bodies with transplanetary remits (IMF, WTO, and so on),
even though agencies with a formally local, national, or regional scope also engage
with issues of global production, exchange, and consumption. Similarly, institution-
alist investigations of so-called ‘regime complexes’ have normally explored the
intersections of multiple global institutions, without considering equally how
planet-spanning organizations intersect with regional apparatuses, national govern-
ments, and local authorities. A Theory, too, concentrates mainly on global-level
agencies and gives but passing attention to their entanglements with regulatory
arrangements on other scales. To this extent Zürn’s ‘global governance system’ is
conceptualized to operate on its own discrete plane.
Certainly, it has been important in recent decades to insist, inter alia with insti-
tutionalist regime theory, on the distinctive impact of global-scale governance bod-
ies. As noted earlier, state-centrism and a concomitant focus on the national level is
deeply embedded in modern social science and political consciousness. Putting a
specific focus on global regulatory agencies has helped to counter unviable meth-
odological statism/nationalism/territorialism.
However, underlining the relative autonomy of global regulatory organizations
also risks reifying ‘the global level’. Thereby the global comes to be constructed
as a sphere unto itself, ontologically separate from other arenas of governance.
Such isolation of discrete spaces of regulation patently does not exist in practice.
For example, global governance conferences today normally include involvement
from regional, national, and local agencies as well as constitutionally global institu-
tions. Hence, the global in global governance never stands on its own.
Most scholars would now readily acknowledge this point about overlapping and
intersecting scales; yet, in practice IR institutionalists – and indeed most other gov-
ernance researchers – still tend to separate ‘levels’. Thus, for instance, the United
Nations (UN) is presented as a ‘global’ actor, when its actions actually have a
global-regional-national-local character. Similarly, the European Union is defined
as a ‘regional’ actor, when its concrete activities range across spatial scales. The
Chinese state is treated as a ‘national’ actor, when its field of play, too, is
local-to-global. The same goes for substate authorities. Official constitutional juris-
dictions and concrete political practices have different geographies.
To counter the reification of spaces, one can shift thinking from ‘globality’ to
‘transscalarity’. The latter vocabulary conveys that, in governance, connections
across scales are as important as operations at any level. Hence, instead of focusing
on separate strata, contemporary governance research needs to range across and
combine geographical spheres. A broadly similar point is often conveyed with
notions such as ‘multi-level governance’, ‘network governance’, ‘new medievalism’,
‘polycentricity’, and ‘new constitutionalism’. Likewise, in principle the institution-
alist concept of regime complex could be adapted to encompass interrelated scales,
rather than to consider only the global level.
An ontological switch from separated levels to integrated scales promotes a wel-
come redirection of focus from institutions to issues. In other words, the main
research concern becomes not how a particular governing body operates, but
how a given substantive matter is handled. After all, to examine institutions is
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only a means; the greater aim is to understand concrete problems. Hence the fore-
most concern is not the UN but peace, not Gavi the Vaccine Alliance but health,
and so on. In this way, a conceptual reorientation from institutional levels to trans-
scalar relations also moves focus from actors to systems.
Incorporating (deeper) social structures
While the above two problems with institutionalist global governance research in IR
can be substantially handled through adjustments within the paradigm, a third
issue (namely, to integrate deeper social structures) requires a more fundamental
ontological overhaul. As Zürn’s work illustrates, liberal-institutionalist international
theory conceives of global governance primarily in terms of directly tangible law
and organization. Such an approach posits that world order is made from explicit
rules and concrete administrative arrangements. Institutionalist IR theory thereby
regards an ‘institution’ to be an immediately perceptible phenomenon, such as a
statute or a bureaucratic office.
Yet, governance – as a process of establishing, enacting, evaluating, and changing
regulatory arrangements in society – may also be less directly visible and less obvi-
ously embodied. Deitelhoff and Daase in this symposium write similarly of ‘more
hidden’ and ‘opaque’ forms of rule.13 Thus global governance can occur both ‘at the
surface’ through actors and ‘behind the scenes’ through social structures. Yet, IR
institutionalism tends to limit itself to the former.
In contrast, ‘institutionalism’ as pursued in social research outside IR usually has
a broader understanding of ‘institutions’. For these other theories, institutions can
be impalpable (e.g. in race structures) as well as tangible (e.g. in business organiza-
tions). They can be semi-consciously reproduced (e.g. in a ritual) as well as delib-
erately enacted (e.g. in a policy decision). They can be diffusely manifested (e.g.
through a discourse) as well as specifically embodied (e.g. in a treaty).
To be sure, ‘institutions’ – in a broader sociological understanding as regularized
patterns of interactive behavior – have figured in other IR theories beyond liberal
institutionalism. For example, constructivists have considered the governing
power of certain ‘embedded’ norms, such as ‘free trade’, ‘human rights’, and ‘sus-
tainable development’. In addition, the recent so-called ‘practice turn’ in construct-
ivist international theory has highlighted the regulating effects of everyday
routines.14 Meanwhile, a range of other theories (e.g. Marxism, feminism, postco-
lonialism, poststructuralism, and posthumanism) examine global governing
through macro social structures such as anthropocentrism, capitalism, neoliberal
governmentality, patriarchy, and western modernity.
However, IR institutionalist analysis of global governance has remained mostly
silent on social structures in all of these forms (norms, practices, and macro orders).
In A Theory and elsewhere, IR institutionalism generally presumes that global regu-
lation is solely actor-driven, as individuals and groups pursue their preferences
through explicit rules and tangible organizations. IR institutionalists leave unex-
plored the notion that actors, perceptions, interests, regulatory measures, and
13Deitelhoff and Daase 2020, 123, 126.
14Cf. Leander 2020; Pouliot 2020.
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governing bodies might also contain and transmit deeper social-structural forces.
At best, IR institutionalism holds a hesitant dialog with constructivist notions of
embedded norms, while critical accounts of macro social structure are generally
ignored altogether.
It does seem curious that liberal institutionalists in IR continue to decline invita-
tions for interchange and mutual learning with social-structural analysis. My own
experience of several decades of field investigations of global governance suggests
that deeper structures have powerful impacts on institutional arrangements, and
vice versa. Sitting onsite it just seems impossible to make adequate sense of the
activities around me without invoking forces connected with anthropocentrism,
capitalism, hegemonic states, modern rationalism, and intersecting social stratifica-
tions. Research and policy surely, and sorely, need global governance theory that
integrates all three types of forces: actor attributes, embedded norms/practices,
and macro structures.
Broadening dynamics of legitimacy
This general urging to look beyond institutional dynamics in global governance can
also be directed more particularly to research on legitimacy. Investigations of socio-
logical legitimacy – that is, perceptions by subjects that a governor has a right to
rule and exercises it appropriately – have attracted significant attention in contem-
porary global governance studies, including A Theory.15 The prominence of the
issue is understandable, given that contestation around the legitimacy of global gov-
ernance institutions has persisted for several decades. Think only of anti-globalist
populism, ‘Occupy!’ protests, and initiatives by so-called ‘emerging powers’ to cre-
ate alternative regional and global bodies. One may ask how – without greater elite
and popular confidence in and support for global governance institutions –
adequate policies can be developed to meet today’s pressing planetary challenges.
So where do such legitimacy beliefs come from?
IR institutionalist studies root the sources of legitimacy mainly in the purpose,
procedure, and performance of the global governance organizations. On such
accounts, a global regulatory body obtains trust and approval from its audiences
because of institutional features: its mandate, its operations, and/or its results.
Many institutionalists have spoken in this regard of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy.
Discussions then center on whether the democratic, technocratic, or fair qualities of
a global governance institution’s conduct and/or outcomes matter most in generat-
ing legitimacy beliefs among its subjects.16
There are of course good reasons to suppose that institutional features matter for
legitimacy in global governance. Already a century ago, Max Weber focused his
path-breaking conceptualization of sociological legitimacy largely on the qualities
of governing organizations. Subsequently Beetham, Easton, Habermas, and other
theorists have also underlined the importance of institutional grounds of legitimate
rule. Empirically, too, we observe that unhappiness with institutional purpose,
15Tallberg et al. 2018.
16Cf. Barnett 2020.
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procedure, and performance have fueled much elite and popular discontent with
global governance.
However, it is another thing to suppose, on institutionalist lines, that legitimacy
in global governance derives only from institutional conditions. Beliefs in the (il)
legitimacy of global rules and regulatory arrangements may also have deeper struc-
tural sources.17 For example, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) long suffered major legitimacy difficulties because it was widely
viewed as a tool of United States hegemony, even though the institutional workings
of the regime were generally regarded as participatory and effective. Conversely,
capitalism arguably has supplied substantial structural stocks of elite legitimacy
for global financial governance, however poorly its core institutions have often
functioned. Likewise, discursive structures (e.g. language and mindsets around
‘development’, ‘human rights’, and ‘security’) can have powerful legitimating con-
sequences for a global governance institution even when its operations accomplish
little. In general, a global regulatory organization gains greatest strength when it can
draw upon both (and mutually reinforcing) institutional and structural sources of
legitimacy. Thus, like global governance studies overall, research on legitimacy
beyond the state would benefit from a methodology – hitherto underdeveloped –
that interlinks surface actor dynamics and deeper structural forces.
Concurrently with a macro turn toward social structure, institutionalist investi-
gations of legitimacy could fruitfully also take a micro turn to incorporate individ-
ual sources of confidence in global governance arrangements. The premise here is
that, alongside institutional and structural sources, legitimacy also derives signifi-
cantly from the personal and psychological circumstances of the perceiving subject.
For example, an individual with low social trust may not accord a global governance
organization legitimacy, regardless of how democratic, effective, and fair the
agency’s institutional qualities might be. Other individual-level conditions that
potentially shape legitimacy beliefs include a subject’s political knowledge, self-
interest calculations, self-identity constructions, and reception of political commu-
nications.18 Whereas literature from sociology and structural international theory
can help institutionalists take a macro turn, research in political psychology and
comparative politics can guide a micro turn. A few studies have already sought
to synthesize individual and institutional dimensions of legitimacy in global gov-
ernance,19 but this track wants more work.
Yet, the fullest and most promising integration would come with a trilateral
combination of individual, institutional, and structural sources of legitimacy in glo-
bal governance.20 Separation of the three aspects in most existing literature is arti-
ficial and unsustainable: why would determinants of legitimacy be either
psychological or organizational or societal? Far more intuitive is a proposition of
combined and mutual causation, where the three forces are each concurrently
expressed through, and shaped by, the other two. To be sure, such a holistic
approach poses challenges, in particular demanding deeper interdisciplinarity
17Scholte 2018.
18Dellmuth 2018.
19E.g. Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015.
20Scholte 2019.
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than global governance scholarship has attempted to date. But after decades of
institutionalist predominance, might the field now be ripe for a more daring para-
digm shift?
Integrating positive and normative analysis
As Michael Zürn would agree, and as several other contributors to this symposium
also note, legitimacy is a normative as well as a sociological question.21 Researchers
have their own perceptions of rightful authority as much as the subjects who are
researched. Indeed, academics have provided some of the most thoughtful articula-
tions of values by which the legitimacy (or otherwise) of global governance institu-
tions might be judged. Substantial literatures have developed around standards for
global justice in its cultural, ecological, economic, and political dimensions.
Yet, institutionalist global governance theory has generally tapped little into this
explicitly normative work. Following a time-honored division of labor in modern
academe, explanation has been approached as a value-free exercise for the ‘scien-
tists’, while evaluation has been allocated to data-poor ‘philosophers’. Neither
group has ventured far into the domain of the other. In this vein, A Theory
makes only passing, rather reluctant, and quite generic reference to normative
issues. Indeed, Zürn’s discussion of ‘four models of global order with cosmopolitan
intent’ mostly addresses institutional design rather than underpinning values.22
The worry is that such separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ can lead institutionalists to
become normatively cliché or, worse, to lack moral compass. Thus, many ‘scien-
tists’ offer little more than loose endorsements of ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’,
‘multiculturalism’, ‘peace’, and ‘sustainable development’ in world affairs, with little
contemplation of what these principles could entail more precisely. Meanwhile
other ‘scientific’ institutionalism loses sight of normative questions altogether,
developing highly sophisticated methodologies without a sense of larger purpose.
Indeed, silence on value questions can tend in effect to reinforce the global status
quo, including its potentially objectionable qualities. Indeed, one wonders whether
the outwardly amoral character of most institutionalist research has reflected a cer-
tain complacency about liberal world order. Much of this work, including A Theory,
seems to assume an inherent goodness of universal human rights, worldwide rep-
resentative government, open international economy, and peaceful settlement of
disputes through international law and multilateral cooperation. Such institutional-
ism does not consider the possibility that liberalist global governance could (in
some respects and however inadvertently) in practice facilitate material inequality,
epistemicide, ecological destruction, and undemocratic suprastate authority.
Liberals are then repeatedly surprised to witness backlashes against their vision:
with the New International Economic Order during the 1970s, in the anti-
globalization movement around the turn of the millennium, with Occupy! in
2011–12, and in populist nationalism currently. When might IR institutionalists
dare to imagine that there could be other alternatives to liberalism besides
mercantilism?
21Buchanan and Keohane 2006.
22Zürn 2018, ch. 9.
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Subordination of normative issues in institutionalist theory is arguably intercon-
nected with the previously discussed neglect of deeper social structures. For
example, shortfalls of global democracy often link closely with transplanetary stra-
tifications of class, country, gender, and race. Problems of global distributive justice
come into sharper relief with a structural analysis of capitalism. Challenges of glo-
bal cognitive justice – that is, ethics for constructive negotiation of cultural diversity
and difference in world affairs – largely relate to structural hierarchies of identity
and knowledge. Questions of global ecological justice become clearer when deeper
structures of anthropocentrism and extractivism are brought into focus. To this
extent, the incorporation of more structural analysis could also facilitate greater
and more reflexive normative awareness than institutionalist global governance the-
ory has generally provided.
To be sure, the present call for more integration of positive and normative ana-
lysis in global governance research, beyond a value-shallow institutionalism, does
not advocate a politicization of theory in which passion trumps logic and evidence.
The intent is rather to urge careful and explicit attention to the normative motiva-
tions and implications of each academic investigation. In addition, heightened eth-
ical consciousness might be applied to the execution of global governance
investigations, thereby making visible questions of (non-)participation, just
resource allocation, transcultural engagement, and ecological footprints within
the research process itself. Greater normative mindfulness furthermore would
involve anticipating the potential political use (and misuse) of research findings.
In short, a more holistic global governance theory, beyond institutionalism,
would comprehensively interweave explanatory and evaluative knowledge.
Overcoming Euro-centrism
A particular normative-intellectual issue, already touched upon above with the
question of cognitive justice, is the prevailing Euro-centrism of existing institution-
alist global governance scholarship. With Euro-centrism, ‘global’ regulation is pre-
dominantly understood as it is perceived and practiced on western-modern lines,
especially in Europe and North America. In this vein, all of the cited literature
and most of the concrete examples in A Theory come from the culturally, econom-
ically, historically, and politically dominant global north – even if the book amply
notes the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The result
– however unconscious and unintended – is a hegemonic knowledge that excludes
‘the other’: the global south, the subaltern, the religious, and so on.
To identify Euro-centrism in modern academe is hardly a new discovery. By now
most reflexive ‘western’ scholars, including Zürn, readily acknowledge this bias in
their work. As a limited countervailing step, a fringe of recent research has focused
on global governance institutions based outside the North Atlantic core.23 In add-
ition, several projects have ventured to facilitate dialog among diverse world-order
conceptions of global governance.24 However, the majority of institutionalists (and
indeed international theorists more generally) still shrug, apologetically or not, that
23E.g. Kayaoglu 2015.
24Katzenstein 2010; Scholte 2015, 2020a.
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Euro-centrism is ‘just the way things are’. In this light it seems unfortunate that
Keohane in this symposium responds to shortfalls in institutionalism by counseling
a return to equally Euro-centric realism.25
This situation is problematic, not least normatively. Euro-centric exclusions of
different perspectives and experiences of global governance are in good part an
undemocratic exercise of arbitrary knowledge power that suppresses marginalized
voices. The dominance of western-modern institutionalism results not only from
professional excellence – as established by peer review and the like – but also sub-
stantially from inherited privilege as embedded in world-historical structures. This
is not per se to discredit Euro-centric accounts of global governance. However, it is
to urge greater humble realization on the part of western-modern institutionalists
of their specific historical positionality, as well as to encourage orthodox researchers
to suspend their cultural parochialism to listen to and learn from other life-worlds.
Such transcultural exploration would not only be a normatively democratic
move, but could also be politically timely. Contemporary global politics appears
to be moving beyond Euro-American hegemony. True, the speed of this shift
can be exaggerated, and the degree to which emergent forces in global governance
are ‘non-western’ (in the sense of departing from core structures of western mod-
ernity) can also be debated. Still, global power distributions are changing, and per-
sistent Euro-centrism in global studies may work against sorely needed global
cooperation as political constellations shift in the decades ahead. As Barnett sug-
gests, global governance might get more support if it ceased to be identified with
a liberal international order.26
Indeed, a reorientation of cultural politics in global governance research could
also be concretely productive. After all, Euro-centric western-modern liberalism
may not have all the answers for contemporary planetary concerns. For example,
concepts of ‘buen vivir’ and ‘florestania’ from indigenous epistemologies in Latin
America could offer valuable alternatives to ‘sustainable development’ in global
ecological governance.27 Islamic notions of jihad could shed important insight
on questions of global justice.28 Talanoa practices from the Pacific and hehe
ideas from China could provide new approaches to global conflict transformation.29
In these and other cases, Euro-centrism could be depriving global governance the-
ory of valuable insights and policy tools.
Conclusion
Prompted by both enthusiastic reception of and certain reservations over Michael’s
Zürn’s A Theory of Global Governance, this commentary has reflected on possibil-
ities going forward beyond institutionalist IR. From a position of critical global pol-
itical sociology, I have particularly urged: (a) further distance from state-centrism;
(b) greater attention to transscalar qualities of global governing; (c) more
25Keohane 2020.
26Barnett 2020; see also Pouliot 2020.
27Maldonado 2009; Gudynas 2011.
28Mostafa 2010.
29Halapua and Halapua 2010; Xu et al. 2010.
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incorporation of social-structural aspects of global regulation; (d) trilateral integra-
tion of individual, institutional and structural sources of legitimacy in global gov-
ernance; (e) more synthesis of positive and normative analysis; and (f) critical
distancing from Euro-centrism. Together, these reorientations imply a transforma-
tive reconstruction of global governance theory, one that arguably could better align
academic endeavors with actual practices and policy priorities in contemporary
world politics.
As emphasized from the outset, this critique does not advocate an abandonment
of institutional research on global governance. On the contrary, as epitomized by A
Theory, institutional analysis makes large and crucial contributions to knowledge.
One cannot make adequate sense of world order today without full consideration
of the organizational workings of regulatory bodies with planetary remits – and
the objectives, perceptions, calculations, and tactics of the actors who engage in
these policy processes.
Rather, the key problem identified in this essay is institutionalism: that is, the
tendency to limit understanding of global governance to a positive analysis of
the organizational dynamics of global-level agencies in a western-liberal mold. Of
course, it is necessary to circumscribe an analysis to retain manageability, but
some delimitations unhelpfully curtail important knowledge and politics.
Marginalization of nonstate actors, reification of spaces, neglect of deeper struc-
tures, separation of normative and positive analysis, and exclusion of the
non-West are instances of such counterproductive analytical boundaries: counter-
productive in the sense of removing alternative explanations (that warrant a hear-
ing) and obstructing alternative politics (that warrant a try).
To underline, the program prescribed here is transformative. It is not realized by
adding a few knobs to institutionalism: a bit more nonstate actors here, a bit of dee-
per structure there, an occasional study of BRICS, and so on. Instead, the best of
existing institutionalist international theory would be integrated with the best of
network analysis, critical geography, structural sociology, normative political the-
ory, and global cultural studies. The result of this transdisciplinary synthesis
would be something qualitative different from the global governance theories
known so far.
Of course, this transformative vision will raise objections, not least from IR insti-
tutionalists. Theoretically, it might be argued that the scale of analytical ambition is
excessive, asking scholars to handle a ‘meta-perspective’ with inaccessible degrees of
innovation and complexity. Empirically, it might be argued that datasets are lacking
for the suggested analysis. Practically, it might be argued that too many habits,
reputations and resources are vested in IR institutionalism to unseat this paradigm
of global governance research. Normatively, it might be argued that propositions for
post-liberal world orders are uncertain and untested. Politically, it might be argued
that liberal-internationalists are reluctant to contemplate post-westernist world
orders that contest their knowledge/power. On these grounds and more, one
could anticipate considerable resistance to the alternative and transformational
course sketched here.
Yet, at the bottom line one has to ask what sort of knowledge is wanted to meet
contemporary politics. A dominance of institutionalism in past global governance
theory has paralleled (and facilitated) a dominance of liberalism in past global
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governance practice. This knowledge-practice nexus has over many decades often
advanced cooperation in and for an increasingly global world. However, for the
six reasons elaborated here, marginal intellectual returns of liberal institutionalism
are generally slowing, while practical pressures are inexorably growing around
global-scale challenges of cultural pluralism, democracy, distributive justice, eco-
logical integrity, liberty, material well-being, moral conduct, peace, and solidarity.
However, difficult and painful it can be to discard old academic habits, we may
need to try something different.
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